25 Security Loan & T Co v Estudillo, 134 CaL 166 66 Pac 257 (1901 ) Although an attorney can ordinarily be required to di v ulge the name of his client still where the informa- tion is asked only for the purpose of incrimi- nating him the attorney my not "be forced to answer So where the attorney acted for certain persons accused of election frauds, he may not be forced to tell who employed him to defend them where the only purpose of the inquiry is to obtain e v idence to con v ict those who ejnployed hiM Ex parte McDonough, 170 CaL 230, 149 Pac 566, L r A 1916 C 593 (1915 ) 28 " If he knew nothing but what his client had communicated to him, he could not be compelled to disclose that; but if he became acquainted with his client's signature, in any other manner, though it was subsequent to his retainer, he was bound to answer, for an attorney and counsel may be questioned, as to a collateral fact within his knowledge, or as to a fact which he may know, without being entrusted with it as an attorney in the cause" Johnson v Da v ern E 19 Johns ( X Y) 1374, 136 10 Am Dec 198 (1821), per Spencer, c J 29 Funk v Mohr, 185 111 395 57 N E 2 ( 1 900 ) 30 Laflin v Herrington, ] Black ( U S) 3-26, 17 L e D45 (18(51): Smith v Guerre (Te \Ci v App 1913 ) 159 S \ v 417 In case two or more persons are concerned in the communications made to an attorney it seems that one alone cannot wai v e so far as their mutual inter- ests are in v ol v e D34 1165 Clergyme N 35 At the common law although there was much endea v or to force a recognition of confessions to priests or spiritual ad v isers as being- pri v ileged and therefore, like communications between attorney and client and husband aud wife, not subject to disclosure, the courts did not gi v e recognition to this v ie W 36 In many jurisdictions, howe v er, this situation has been changed by statute, an ordinary pro v ision being that no clergyman or priest shall re- v eal any "' confession made to him in his professional character, in the course of discipline enjoined by the church to which he belongS" Under such a stat- ute it is not enough to render the communication pri v ileged that it is made to a clergyman or prie St If it is not made to such a person in his professional character and because enjoined by the rules of discipline or practice of such religious denomination the pri v ilege does not atta Ch37 1166 Husband and Wife; General Rul E 38 Communications between hus- band and wife were early recognized as pri v ileged and neither could be com- pelled to disclose what took place between theM 39 The theory upon which the rule was founded was that the confidence, peace and harmony which should exist between spouses would be seriously disturbed if testimony as to such matters should be recei v ed and that the exclusion of such e v idence would tend 36 "'The cases of pri v ilege are confined to alone to show that he was not of sound mind solicitors and their clients: and stewards, as these are pri v ileged communications, parents, medical attendants, clergymen and Whitehead v Kirk, 104 Miss 776, 61 So 737, persons in the most closely confidential rela- 62 So 432, 51 L r A ( X S ) 187 (1913 ) tion are bound to disclose communications Effect of Statute allowing 1 Testimony made to theM" Greenlaw v King, 1 Bea v against each othe r E v en a statute making 137, 145 (1838), per Langdale, M r a husband or wife competent to testify to better preser v e and protect these most necessary essentials to the permanency of the family circle, and therefore to the betterment of societ Y 40 It was the belief that greater mischief would result from the admission of such e v idence than would ensue from its exclusio N 41 In other words the rule of exclusion was one of public polic Y 4 - \\'here the information is not a result of marital confidence but is obtained from some outside source, it is held that the rule does not appl Y 43 Communications made after the termination of the relationship may be used 44 although the termination of the marital relation through death 45 or di v orce 4ti after the communication is made does not affect the application of the rul E If the communication was made in the presence of a third person, 47 e v en a child of age to understand 48 or an ea v esdropper, 49 it is not regarded as a pri v ate communication and hence is not pri v ilege DThe rule co v ers letters between husband and wife 50 as well as oral communicationS This pri v ilege is commonly co v ered by statuteS 51 1167 Physician and Patient; Pri v ilege is of Statutory Origi N 52 At com- mon law communications between physician and patient, were not regarded in the same light as those between attorney and client, 53 although the ad v isibility 47 People v Lewis, 62 Hun 622, 16 X Y SuppL 881 (1891), affirmed 136 X Y 633, 32 X E 1014 (1892 ) 48 Lyon v Prouty, 154 Mass 488, 28 X E 908 (1891 ) 49 CoM v (Jriffin, 110 Mass 181 (1872); State v Center, 35 v t 378 (1862 ) 50 Wilkerson v State, 91 G A 729, 737, 17 S E 990 (1893), though husband's letter was deli v ered by wife to anothe r 51 CoM v Cronin, 185 Mass 96, 69 X E 1065 (1904 ) Practical SuggestionS This harsh rule can sometimes be a v oided by cle v er counsel by the use of the negati v e form of questionS For example the editor has in mind a case where the husband claimed that title to cer- tain property was taken in his name as a gift to him and the wife claimed he had taken it in bis name fraudulently using her money to buy it and the counsel for the wife put in her story by asking her whether she had e v er told her husband that she was making this gift to him, etc Here the wife could not of course be asked what she had said to her husband about the matter no other person being pres- ent but the effect of the con v ersation was still put in the record in this wa Y 44 The pri v ilege does not apply where the husband and wife ha v e separated as where the husband writes the wife a threatening lette r McXamara v McXamara, 99 Xe B 9, 154 X \ v 818, L r A 1916 B 1272 (1915 ) Communications between husband and wife after they are di v orced are not pri v ileged, al- though the di v orce is afterwards set aside as being fraudulen T Spearman v State (Te X CriM Rep 1012), 152 S W915 44 L r A ( X S ) 243 Communications by a hus- band to his wife testamentary in nature are admissible in e v idence when found by the wife only after his suicide as then they are not communications by one to the other dur- ing marriage as they were recei v ed after the death of one of the partieS \Yhitford v Xorth State Life InS Co, 163 X c 223, 79 of extending the pri v ilege to this class of eases seems not to ha v e been entirely in disfa v o r 54 In fact the v iew, that such communications should be excluded, began to spread among the judiciary and members of the legal profession, re- sulting finally in enactments by legislati v e bodies, making communications be- tween a physician and his patient pri v ileged/' 5 The pri v ilege created under such statutes co v ers any information recei v ed by the physician as a result of the relation which he has acquired either from oral statements of the patient or as a result of examinations or obser v ations made by hiM 56 The pri v ilege is confined to one who has the right to act as a physi- cian 5T though he be in the employ of another 58 and co v ers statements made to a physician by a patient for the purpose of enabling him to prescribe 59 and the pri v ilege also attaches to statements made by a physician to a patient as to the nature of his disease 60 and its treatment, 61 and includes the mental condition of the patien T 02 Statements made when the relation did not exist are not pri v ilege D03 A physician may be forced to testify to the fact of his employment 64 and his attendance, 65 to affida v its of the cause of death tiled with the proper authorities, 66 to examinations pursuant to the order of the court 7 or at the request of both partieS 68 The statute cannot be in v oked to Atl 313 (1904 ) A physician who discloses on the stand when ordered by the court con- fidential communications of his patient is not liable to ci v il suit by his patien T Smith v Driscoll, 94 Wash 441, 162 Pac 572, L r A 1917 C 1128 (1917 ) Physician's pri v i- lege, see note, Bender, ed, 103 X Y 587 Admissibility of e v idence of examining physi- cian, see not E Bender, ed, 137 X Y 582 Autopsy by Attending Physicia N Under a statute making communications to a phy- sician pri v ileged an attending physician who performs an autopsy immediately after death may not tell of the results of the autopsy and his conclusions therefrom as this would take away from the pri v ilege as the conclusions must ha v e been based in part on what he had learned as the attending physicia N Thomas v Byro N 16S Mich 593 134 X W 1021, 38 L r A ( X S ) 1186 (1912 ) 57 Wiel v Cowles, 45 Hun ( X Y) 307 (1887) ; Head Camp v Loehrer, 17 Colo App 247, 68 Pac 136 (1902 ) 58 Battis v Chicago r T & P R Y Co 124 Iowa 623, 100 X W 543 (1904 ) 67 People v Glo v er, 71 Mich 303, 3S X W 874 (1888) (examination to determine physical condition of one charged with rape) ; People v Sline Y 137 X Y 570, 33 X E 150 (1893) (examination of prisoner as to san- ity ) Where the plaintiff is ordered by the court to submit to a physical examination any statements he makes in answer to the defendant's physician are deemed pri v ileged according to the weight of aiithorit v It is argued that this is an abuse of authority to force the plaintiff to submit to examination and thus elicitate from him statements which may be filtered as admissions through an irresponsible witness instead of using the protect crime 69 as in abortion cases 70 and the pri v ilege may be wai v ed by the patient, 71 as where he testifies in regard to the matter 72 or calls on the physician to do So 73 1168 Public Justice; Grand JurorS 74 In the interest of public justice there are certain things which are considered as necessary to protect from dis- closur E Thus in the case of proceedings before the grand jury it is deemed that the administration of public justice may be better secured by pre v enting ample legal process a v ailable to secure the testimony in open cour T In a recent case the court does not decide this question but holds that a statement made v oluntarily by the wit- ness to the doctor may be put in E v idence McGuire v Chicago & A r Co ( Mo 1915), 178 S W79, L r A 1915 F 888 and note 70 Seifert v State, 160 Ind 464, 67 N E 100, 98 Am St Rep 340 (1903); State v Smith, 99 Iowa 26, 68 N W 428, 61 Am St Rep 219 (1896); McKenzie v Banks, 94 Minn 496, 103 X W 497 (1905) 71 Epstein v Pennsyl v ania r Co, 250 Mo 1, 156 S W699 (1913 ) Wai v er of physi- cian's pri v ilege, see note, Bender, ed, 118 N Y 94, 188 X Y 407, 193 N Y 11 Pro v ision in Insurance Polic Y Where an insurance policy pro v ides that the attending physician may testify this is a wai v er of the pri v ilege which binds the beneficiar Y Xa- tional Unity Ass' N v McCall, 103 Ark 201, 146 S W125, 48 L r A ( N S) 418 (1912 ) Wai v er at former TriaL The mere fact that testimony has been gi v en without objec- tion at a former trial does not necessarily constitute a wai v er of the claim that it is pri v ileged at a later trial of the same case especially where the party has not been mis- led by i T Maryland Casualty Co v Maloney, 119 Ark 434, 178 S W387, L r A 1916 A 519 (1915 ) 72 City of Tulsa v Wicker, 42 Okl A 539, 141 Pac 963 (1914); Fulson-Morris Coal & M Co v Mitchell, 37 Okl A 575, 132 Pac 1103 (1913 ) Under a statute declaring that a physician cannot be examined as to com- munications made to him by his patient the latter does not wai v e the pri v ilege by testify- ing to his own condition at the ti Me Ari- zona & New Mexico r Co v Clark, 235 U S 669, 35 Su P Ct Rep 210, L r A 1915 C 834 (1915 ) Where Physician is Claimed to ha v e De- frauded Plaintif F Where the insured claims that she was induced to settle a claim on an insurance policy by false and fraudu- lent statements of the attending physician she has put in issue the cause of death and has wai v ed her statutory pri v ilege of object- ing to the testimony of the physicia N Na- tional Unity Ass N v McCall, 103 Ark 201, 146 S W125, 48 L r A ( N S) 418 (1912 ) 73 Speck v International R Y Co, 133 App Di v 802, 118 N Y SuppL 71 (1909 ) Testimony by another Docto r According to the decided weight of authority the wai v - ing of the pri v ilege by the plaintiff calling one of his physicians does not wai v e his right to object to the testimony of any other physi- cianS Jones v Caldwell, 20 Idaho 5, 116 Pac 110, 48 L r A ( N S) 119 (1911 ) The fact that the plaintiff puts on a physi- cian who testifies as to an examination h made just after the injury does not wai v e the pri v ilege as to examination by another phy- sician before the injur Y The court lays down the rule that wai v er only takes place as to another doctor who examined in com- pany with the doctor who testifieS Mays v New Amsterdam Casualty Co, 40 App Dc 249, 46 L r A ( N S) 1108 (1913 ) A pa- tient wai v es his pri v ilege by going on the stand and telling his ailments and putting one physician on the stand also and he cannot then object to other doctors who attended him telling what they know, although the pri v i- lege arises under a statute as the wai v er may be engrafted on the statut E The point is that the pri v ilege if secrecy applies to his physical condition and when he v oluntarily tells this he should then not object to the whole truth being know N Epstein v Penn- syl v ania r Co, 250 Mo 1, lf>6 S W699, 48 L r A ( N S) 394 (1913 ) any inquiry in regard thereto, 75 except that it may be shown by statute in some states that a witness testified differently before the grand jury than at the later triaL 76 1169 [Public Justice]; Petty or Tra v erse JurorS 77 Much the same situa- tion exists, where it is de-sired to introduce testimony of petty or tra v erse jurors, as to some mistake, irregularity or misbeha v ior on the part of the jury, for the purpose of impeaching their v erdict, it being generally decided that such testimony will be exclude Dli! 1170 Secrets of State 79 In the case of matters relating to affairs of state, it is clearly apparent that there are many communications which it is essential should be protected from disclosur E While the disco v ery of truth, as an aid in the administration of justice, is particularly to be desired and sought for, yet the proper administration of public affairs, both state and national, particu- larly the latter, require that often times the executi v e and heads of depart- ments should not be hampered by any interference from the courtS 80 It is, therefore, deemed ad v isable that, whene v er, the executi v e departments consider that certain matters or communications should not be di v ulged, their opinion or decision shall be regarded as binding upon the courts and testimony concern- ing them will not be compelle D81 76 Jenkins v State, 35 Fl A 737, 18 So former reco v ery was had, not upon the merits, 182, 48 Am St Rep 267 ( 1805) : Pritchett but upon some technical objection to the form v Frisby, 112 K Y 629, 23 K Y L Rep 2035, of action or otherwis E" Follansbee v 66 S W503 (1002): State v Thomas, 99 Walker, 74 Pa St 306, 310 (1873), per Shars- Mo 235, 12 S W643 (1S89 ) wood, J See Heffron v Gallupe, 55 Me 563 1171 Examination of WitnesseS 1 In the use of witnesses, as a media of proof, the administrati v e power of the presiding judge, stands out most clearl Y It is here that his ability to work out by the use of reason the results of sub- stantial justice, in connection with the rules of law substanti v e or procedural, is greatly increase DHa v ing in v iew the object of judicial administration, the disco v ery of truth as an aid to the attainment of justice, much rests in the exercise of sound reason by the presiding judge or as it is frequently termed the exercise of sound discretion by hiM So many and v aried are the circum- stances de v eloped in the case of different witnesses, ha v ing regard to their characters, intelligence, and memory, the effect of bias upon their minds and other similar factors that the court is continually confronted with different situations in administering the rules of E v idence In each and e v ery instance the judicial mind must be imbued with the thoughts of disco v ering the truth and of thus securing substantial justice to the parties and for this purpose the presiding judge must in all cases endea v or, by the exercise of sound reason in the proper administration of the rules of e v idence, to attain these objectS 1172 Direct Examination; Leading QuestionS 2 An elementar v rule of e v i- dence, in the examination of witnesses, is that leading questions will not be allowe D3 As to what is a leading question is often a matter of much nicet Y It may be stated, generally, howe v er, that any question which contains in it a suggestion to the witness of the answer desired falls within the prohibitio N 4 The presiding judge will, in all cases, take care to pre v ent any question being asked of a witness which is so framed or put to him as to indicate the particular answer which is wante DThe fact that a question may be answered by " yes " or " no " does not stamp it as necessarily leading, 5 while a question put in the alternati v e form as " whether or not " is usually not regarded as leadin g 6 Whether a question is leading is peculiarly a question for the presiding judg E 7 A question which assumes the existence of facts which ha v e not been established is ordinarily regarded as leading s but not where such facts are admitted to exi St 9 Leading questions may be put when they are preliminary to the matters in contro v ersy to expedite the triaL 10 The court may allow the use of leading questions where a person's memory is exhausted concerning a matter u or where the witness is clearly hostile to the party producing him 12 or in the case of children, 13 or feeble-minded per- sons, 14 illiterates ir> or foreigners with a limited knowledge of the English languag E 16 1173 Use of Memoranda to Refresh Memor Y 17 The mind of a witness will frequently not contain a present recollection of some past e v ent or transac- tio N Where such a situation arises the presiding judge may permit the use of memoranda by a witness for the purpose of refreshing his mind and re v i v ing his recollectio N 9 Erie & P Despatch v Cecil, 112 111 180 be cautioned to tell not what they thought or (1884) ; Willey v Portsmouth.

35 X H 303 inferred but what they saw or heard, and for (1857); Hays v State (Te X C r App 1892), this reason it is usually best to ask them 20 S W361 shortly, "Tell the court what talk you heard, 10 " If the questions relate to introductory telling the con v ersation as near as you ca N matter and be designed to lead the witness stating just what each party said," o r " Tell with the more expedition to what is material the court what you actually saw with your to the issue, it is captious to object to i T e v en own eyeS" after he has testified on direct examination, no opportunity therefor is afforded as in case of his death 2 " or illness, 21 or where a party to the proceeding refuses to answer, 22 or from some other cause 23 his testimony will be rejecte DTin- mere appearance and swearing of a witness, howe v er, when 110 testimony is gm-n by him, is frequently not regarded as conferring any such right, 24 and this result of course follows in those jurisdictions where the cross-examination of a witness is limited by the direct examinatio N 1175 [Cross Examination] ; Scope o F 25 The question whether the cross- examination of a witness must be limited to those matters concerning which he has been examined in chief or may extend to any facts in the case which are rele v ant and may be a part of the opponent's case is one upon which the de- cisions are not uniforM The great weight of authority, howe v er, although there are se v eral decisions to the contrary, 26 supports the doctrine that it is so limited and that if a party desires to examine a witness as to any other matter he can only do so by calling him as his own witness at the proper ti Me 27 This rule is not generally construed as meaning that a witness can be cross-exam- ined as to a particular subject only to the extent that it has been gone into on the direct examination, for if a matter is touched upon there, as for instance part of a con v ersation or transaction, a legitimate subject for cross-examination is thus presented in so far as the matter may constitute a unit Y 28 It is often difficult to determine just how far the cross-examination of a witness may pro- ceed before the limit has been reached or passe DIn each case the question must be determined by the presiding judge in the exercise of sound discre- tio N 29 The use of leading questions is always allowed in cross-examination 30 unless it appears that the witness is friendly to the cross-examining counseL 31 The cross-examination may always bring out matters not fully disclosed by the direct examination 32 but the extent of cross-examination as to collateral or irrele v ant facts is for the determination of the presiding judg E 33 Questions which assume the existence of facts which ha v e not been pro v ed will be ex- clude D34 1176 Redirect Examinatio N 35 After the cross-examination of a witness has been completed the right of the party by whom he was called to re-examine him within proper limits, is recognize DIt is stated generally that no right exists to introduce new matter at this stage, 30 as it is considered that the party has had full opportunity, on the direct examination, to bring out all facts which are material and rele v ant to his contentio N The real purpose of the redirect examination is to obtain an explanation 3T of statements made on the cross- examination which tend to create doubts and to contradict matters drawn forth on the direct examinatio N Thus it is permissible to show the moti v e, pro v ocation, or reason which influenced the witness in respect to certain state- ments made by him, 38 or to further interrogate him as to new matter thus disclosed, 39 as in case of a con v ersation or transaction to bring it out in fulL 40 Leading questions will ordinarily be excluded on redirect examinatio N 41 This, howe v er, is left largely to the presiding judge to determine as a matter of sound administratio N 42 1177 Examinations Subsequent to Re-dire Ct 43 After the re-direct exami- nation of a witness, a recross-examinatiou is, in some cases, permitted, 44 as where new matter has been gone into on the forme r 45 Whether such a pri v - ilege will be accorded and, if so, the extent to which the examination may go is in each case a question for the presiding judge to determin E If he is of opinion that no useful result will ensue he may refuse to permit a recross-exam- ination, or, after it has been entered upon, to allow its continuanc E 46 An examination in sufrebuttal may likewise be allowed by the presiding judge where he may deem it necessary in the interests of justic E 47 1178 Recalling of WitnesseS 48 Whether a witness, who has been exam- ined, may be recalled is a matter which rests largely with the presiding judg E If he deems it ad v isable, as an aid in eliciting the truth and, therefore, as tend- ing to the furtherance of justice, he will permit such a course to be pursue D49 1179 Pri v ilege as to Self-Incriminatio N 50 The doctrine which protects a witness from self-incrimination permits him in any proceeding, ci v il or crim- inal, to decline to answer any question which would expose him, or tend to ex- pose him, to a criminal prosecutio N 51 It is not essential, in order for a wit- ness to a v ail himself of the pri v ilege, that the answer might of itself be sufficient to ha v e this resul T If it should happen that the fact concerning which the question relates may be only a link in a chain of circumstances, or one of a series of acts which as a whole, would produce this result he may refuse to He may also claim the pri v ilege where the answer might subject him to a penalty or forfeiture 53 or, in some states might degrade him 54 but not simply where the answer may result in pecuniary loss 55 or ci v il liabilit Y 56 The pri v ilege extends to writingS 57 The court may, 58 but need not, 59 inform the witness of his pri v ileg E The pri v ilege is personal to the witness and can be in v oked only by him and may be terminated by wai v er, 61 as where the witness testifies, 62 or by operation of 1180 Application of Maxim " Falsus in Uno, Falsus in OmnibuS" l The maxim " falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus " is frequently called to the attention of juries, as bearing upon the weight which is to be gi v en to the testimony of a witness who has testified falsely in one or more particularS 2 In some cases it is said that where such a situation exists the testimony should be rejected as a whole and instructions to this effect ha v e been sustaine D3 Such a doctrine, howe v er, is not fa v ored, 4 it being considered that the maxim is to be applied by the jury, 5 or by the judge when acting without a jury 6 according to the circumstances of the cas E The generally accepted v iew is that the mere fact of a witness ha v ing sworn falsely in one respect is not of itself, a reason for the rejection of his entire testimon Y The jury may reject that which is shown to be false and accept the remainder, or they may reject it alL 1181 Right to Impea Ch7 After the examination of a witness the ad v er- sary of the party calling him is entitled to impeach his credit for the purpose of affecting the weight of his testimony with the jur Y This may be done either by the testimony of other witnesses or by the cross-examination of the witness himself, the object being to show that his testimony is, either in part or in whole, discredite D to this effect, with a slight difference in their manner of stating the reason, in substance all base their conclusion upon the idea that the one who presents a witness to the court in support of his case represents him as worthy of belief and will not subsequently be permitted to impeach him by e v idence to the con- trar Y 10 Thus a party may not put in e v idence for the purpose of impeachment that a witness has made contradictory statements n or is influenced b v bias 12 except to refresh his recollection la or in some jurisdictions in case of sur- prise 14 or in case of a witness whom the party is obliged to calL 15 The party may produce other witnesses whose testimony on material facts is contradictory to that of his witnesS 10 1183 Opponent's Witness; Characte r 17 It is the general rule that a wit- ness may be impeached only by e v idence of bad character for v eracity 18 and not of general bad character w and e v idence of particular facts is not admis^ sible 2u except in cross-examinatio N 21 E v idence will be recei v ed of a prior con v iction for a crime 2 '~ although the witness has been pardoned 23 or a ne\y trial ordere D24 The character e v idence should be of a time near the trial 25 prosecuting attorney may not impeach his o\ v n witness by stating in the presence of the jury that he told a different story on the stand from what he had told pre v iousl Y Mere failure to testify does not gi v e the right to impeach anyway and he cannot be im- peached in this wa Y Andrews v State, 64 Te X CriM Rep 2, 141 S W220, 42 L r A ( X S ) 747 (1911 ) 10 People v Skeehan/49 Bar B ( X Y) 217, 219 (1867), per Leonard, P J 11 Appeal of Carpenter, 74 Conn 431, 51 Atl 126 (1902 ) 12 Fairly v Fairly, 38 Miss 280 (1859); //; re Melon's E si ate, 56 Hun ( X Y) 555, 13 People v Sherman, 133 X Y 349, 31 X E 107 (1S92 ) 14 People v Brocks, 131 X Y 321, 325, 30 X E 189 (1S92 I 15 Illinois- Thompson v Owe N 174 111 229 51 X E 1046, 45 L r A 6S2 (1S98 ) 16 Ingersoll v English, 66 X J L 463, 49 Atl 737 (1901 ) 17 5 Chamberlayne, E v idence, 3740- 3751 As to character e v idence, see ante, 1025 ct scq.

18 F W Stock & Sons v Dellapenn A 217 503 (1914 ) It seems that in Xew York e v idence of either general bad char- acter or bad character for v eracity is admis- sibl E But see Wright v Rage, 3 K eyes 581 Carlson v Winterman, 10 Misc 388 Adams v Greenwich, Ju*.

Co 70 X Y 388 19 State v Kin g 88 Minn 175 92 X W 9-65 (1903 ) Contra, State v Haupt, 126 Iowa 152, 101 X W 739 (1904 ) What may be asked on cross-examination character of witness, see note, Bender, ed, 32 X Y 131, 140 Gamblin g A witness may be impeached by showing that he li v ed in a gambling place and asking what his habits are, as if the wit- ness had been engaged in any occupation which would tend to impair his credibility the jury is entitled to that informatio N State v Fong Loon, 21) Idaho 24S, 158 Pac 233 L r A 11)1(5 F 111)8 (1916 ) 22 People v Cascon E 185 X Y 317, 78 X E 2S7 (1906 ) A witness may be im- peached by being asked whether he has not l>een con v icted of larceny and later parole DUnited Railways v Phillips, 121) Md 328, 99 Atl 355, L r A 1917 C 384 (1916 ) 23 Curtis v Cochran, 50 X I I 242 (1S70 ) The disqualification of a witness as he had been con v icted of perjury may be remo v ed by the production of a pardon properly con- nected with the crime, but the con v iction may be put in e v idence just the sa Me Rittenberg v Smith, 214 Mass 343 101 X E 989, 47 L r A ( X S ) 215 (1913 ) and of the place where his reputation fairly existed and need not be confined to his present residenc E 26.

1184 [Opponent's Witness] ; Bias or Intere St 27 The bias, 28 or interest 29 of a witness is always recognized as proper, to be considered by the jury as bearing upon the credit to be accorded to his testimon Y When the credit of the witness has been thus attacked his attitude may be explained ;!U and his position in the case as being interested in its outcome 31 pecuniarily or through relationship 32 or friendship with a party may always be show N The fact that he has been or is to be paid for his testimony 3:5 as in case of detecti v es 34 or that he is the complaining witness 35 or an accomplice 30 may always be show N 1185 [Opponent's Witness] ; Contradictory StatementS 37 A frequent mode of impeaching the credit of a witness is by e v idence showing, that at some other time or times, he has made statements inconsistent with, or contradictory to, his present testimon Y 38 This may be done in cross-examination 3S) when the statement is as to a material point in the cas E 40 A proper foundation for this contradiction should be laid by calling the attention of the witness to the alleged contradictory statements and asking him whether he has made them 41 and he should then be gi v en a right to explain theM 42 If the statement was not as to a material fact his statement is conclusi v e and cannot be contra- dicte D43 That the witness denies that he remembers making the -statement 30 People v Zigouras, 163 N Y 250, 57 plice should be recei v ed with cautio N The X'.